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2 there ex.ist no collusive 'equilibria. In fact, if prices at which bidders can submit bids are discrete, there exists a unique equilibrium in undominated strategies in which the auction clears at the highest price that is lower than the value of the good. Thus, the optimal mechanism from the perspective of the auctioneer depends on the equilibria most likely to obtain in uniform-price auctions of shares.
In this paper, we provide experimental evidence on the effect of the mechanism design and non-binding preplay communication on clearing prices and demand schedules in auctions of sbares. Our experiments on uniform-price and discrimnatory auctions indicate that the sensitivity of outcornes to preplay communication varies significantly witb the auction mechanism. Clearing prices and auctioneer's surplus are significantly lower, and aggregate demand at the lowest permitted price is significantly higber in uniform-price experiments permitting preplay communication. The higbest clearing prices. auctioneer's surplus, and aggregate demand-at the competitive price are observed in unifonn-price experiments without preplay communication. In stark contrast to the unifonn-price treatments, preplay communication has little impact in the discriminatory treattnents.
The observed pattems of clearing prices and demands in unifonn-price experiments permitting communication resulted from subjects' demand scbedules conforming closely to those characterizing collusive equilibria. In the discriminatory treatments, regardless of communication opportunities, strategies approximate the unique equilibrium in undominated strategies from the inception of the experiment. In the uniform treatment without communication, a tendency to diverge from both collusive and competitive bebavior is observed. We also examine the symmetry and stability of subject strategies. Tbe symmetry of subjects' strategies increases over time in all treatments. The tendency toward the adoption of symmetric strategies is pronounced 3 in the uniform-price treatment with commuoication as weil as in the discriminatory treatments.2 Variation in subject strategies diminished over time, with the tendency to increased stability being more pronounced in the absence of opportunities for com.munication. This is not the flfst paper to analyze the issuance process for Treasury securities. A number of researchers have investigated the choice of auction mechanism by the Treasury.3
Same of this analysis has investigated the primary market for Treasury bills from an industrial organization perspective: examining the degree of marli.et concentration and participants' profits (see, for example, Meltzer and von der Linde 1960 and Reiber 1964) . Friedrnan (1960) , taking a different approach, examined the range of bids in 13 successive auctions. A second approacb, adopted by Simon (1992) , relied an a comparison of the markup of Treasury auction yields over when-issued yields. A third apprnach was adopted by the Treasury itself. In September 1992, the Treasury undertook a one-year experiment using the uniform-price auction format for its twoyear and five-year note auctions.
These studies, while providing insights into the auctions of shares, do not perm.it the isolation of Strategie bidder behavior from institutional factors. For example, if the group of bidders is small enough and they either have other linkages or they expect to participate in a number of auctions, collusive behavior may emerge even when it is not self-enforcing in any given auction (see, for example, Fudenberg and Maskin 1986) . Similarly, institutional factors make studies, such as the Treasury's experiment, difficult to interpret. If dealers believe tbat, by eschewing profits during the experimentation period, they can ensure that the uniform-price auction mechanism is adopted and they can earn !arger profits after the adoption, they may have 2 Even in uniform-pricc treatments with subject communication in which thc paramcters did not allow for thc cxistence of completely symmetric collusivc Nash equilibria, subjects gravitated towards symmctric strategies that wcrc "close" to almost-symmetric equilibrium strategies. Howcver, in these cases the convcrgcnce was slower and lcss stable. 3 In addition to cmpirical investigations of the U.S. Treasury auctions, researchers bave also studicd auction mcchanisms in other contexts. For examplc, Umlauf (1993) examines Mexican Treasury auctions and Tenorio (1993) examines thc Zambian forcign exchange markets.
--····~·~····---------4 an incentive to utilize the self-enforcing competitive strategies during the experimentation period, switching to collusive strategies aftetwards.
Our experimental data complement these empirical studies. In a controlled experimental setting, such as ours, it is possible to isolate the effects of communication and alternative allocation mechanisms. In addition to providing evidence on equilibrium selection in auctions of shares, our paper extends the extant experimental literature on auctions. This literature is extensive (see, for example, Smith 1967 and Cox, Smith, and Walker 1984) . Much of this literature has also focused on comparing the uniform and discriminatory multi-unit auction mechanisms. However, this strand of research on multi-unit auctions has been limited to examining the outcomes of auctions of units. These auctions do not allow for self-enforcing bidding strategies that extract the auctioneer's surplus. Thus, the issues we attempt to adclress cannot be addressed in such settings.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 1, a simple model is developed that we use to characterize the Nash equilibrium strategy vectors in the various experimental treatments. In Section 2, we describe the procedures followed in perfonning the experiments. In Section 3, we describe the results of the experiments in detail. Section 4 contains some concluding remarks. The Appendix presents the proofs of some of the results clerived in Section L
UNIFORM AND DISCRIMINATORY AUCTIONS OF DMSIBLE GooDS
As a first step to examining bidder strategies in an experimental setting, we characterize equilibrium behavior in auctions. This involves the specification ofbidder and auctioneer payoffs and strategies. Our parameterizations of auctions have been selected to make the auction mechanisms transparent to the subjects, ease their computational burden, and conform with some 5 salient institutional characteristics of Treasury auctions. To simplify the computations and make the auction mechanism transparent, we specify a common unit value. To conform with the institutional characteristics of Treasury auctions, we restrict the number of units that can be bid for by a subject and restrict subjects to placing bids at fixed and discrete price levels. 4
Description of the Experimental Setting
In each of the experiments, l 00 units of a good are for sale. Each unit of the good has a value of 20 to the bidders and a value of 10 to the auctioneer. Bidders in tbe auction attempt to maximize their monetary payoffs. There are 11 bidders in the auction.5 Bidders simultaneously specify demand schedules for the good. Each schedule specifies the number of units the bidder is willing to purchase at each of three prices: 10, 15, and 20. Each bidder can submit only nonnegative integer-valued bids that sum to no more than 100. Let dip represent the number of units of the good demanded by bidder i at price p. Theo bidder ,"s demand schedule can be represented by a 3-tuple, d;" (d;20. das. duo) .
Each bidder's allocation of the good is determined by her demand schedule and the aggregate demand schedule. Let d represent a vector of demand schedules, where d" (d1, d2, """ d11). Let Ap(d) represent the aggregate demand of bidders at a price p, where Ap(d)" r,,d;p. Similarly, Jet Cp(d) represent the cumulative aggregate demand at price p, where 4 'Thesc spccifications diffcrcntiate our modcl from thosc of Back and Zender (1993) and Wilson (1979) , who allow for bidding strategics to rangc ovcr a continuum of pricc and quantitics and allow for morc gcncral informational structures. These points of difference, however, make no qualitative differencc to the nature of tbe Nash equilibrium outcomcs. 5 Most experiments involved exactly 11 subjccts. Formal analysis of subjcct behavior and experimental outcomes is conducted only on this corc group of experiments. In some experiments, because of unavoidable circumstanccs, the number of subjects diffcred from 11. Thc rationale for using 11 subjccts in our cxpcrimcnts is elucidatcd in footnote 8.
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Bidders' payoffs are determined by their allocations and the "clearing price" in the auction. A clearing price exists only if at least 100 units of the good are demanded. If less than 100 units are demanded, the auction is canceled and bidders receive no payoffs. On the other band, if the auction is successful, the clearing or "stop-out" price for the auction is the highest price at whicb cumulative demand frrst equals or exceeds 100. To complete the description of the auction, let C+(d) represent the cumulative aggregate demand at the price immediately above the clearing price, p', where
Given the clearing price, each bidder receives the number of units she demanded at prices above the clearing price and a pro-rated share of her demand at the clearing price. No allocations are received for demand at prices lower than the clearing price. Let the pro-ration factor at price p be represented by the function Xp(d'), where 1Cp(d); 1 at prices above the clearing price and .:_;.~;;?l) at the clearing price. Thus, bidder rs allocation at prices greater than or equal to the clearing price is r;
The bidder's payoff, bowever, is determined by the amount she is required to pay for her allocation. This amount varies with the rules of the auction. In a unifonn-price auction, the price paid for all units is the clearing price. Tbus, bidder i's payoff in a successful auction can be represented byV;(d), wbere V,\d)"' (20 -p") r.,, >p• r;p(d) .
In a discriminatory auction, for each unit that they receive, bidders pay the price at which the bid was submitted. Thus, bidder i's payoff in successful auction can be represented by V~d). where ,,>p•r;p(d) (20-p) .
Under both auction mechanisms, the auctioneer's surplus can be represented by 10 * 100 -
.2 Outcomes of the Auctions
In characterizing the outcomes of these auctions, we focus our attention on Nash equilibria A Nash equilibrium of these auction games is a strategy vector such that the demand schedule submitted by each bidder is a best response to the demand schedules of other bidders. In line with much of the literature on strategic decision-making, we formally examine only Nash equilibria in which bidders adopt pure strategies. When multiple equilibria exist producing the same clearing price, following Back and Zen der ( 1995) , we focus on the symmetric equilibria supporting these outcomes. These equilibria are focal for two reasons: (i) all the bidders are identically endowed and it is more likely that coordination would implement outcomes that would not discriminate between bidders; (ii) communication between subjects seems to indicate that they expected equal treatment. 6
Same properties of these Nash equilibria are fairly obvious. Regardless of the auction mechanism employed, submitting a demand vector of less than 100 units is a dominated strategy.
The logic behind this result is simple, submitting demand at the lowest price of 1 O is never worse than, and is sometimes better, than not submitting any demand at all.7
Lemma 1: In both uniform-price and discriminatory auctions, demanding less than 100 units is a dominated strategy.
--~~~~-·--------6 Almost all the litcrature on auctions has focuscd on symmetric equilibria (see, e.g., Vickrcy 1961). Symmetrie equilibria have also becn the focus of rcscarch in rclated problems such as corporate takeovers (Holmstrom and Nalcbuff 1992) . 7 Using the elimination of dominatcd strategies as a solution concept is common in the literature (see, e.g., Kohlberg and Mertens 1986) . The support for this solution concept is bascd on both classical decision theory (Luce and Raiffa 1957) and thc tbeory of evolutionary stable strategies (Samuelson 1991) . However, Samuelson (1992) points out that this solution concept cannot be dcduccd from the common knowledge of rationality. Further discussion on this subject and its rclationship with our research appears below.
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The above result implies the following obvious corollary. In any Nash equilibrium in undominated strategies, d*, total demand is no lower than the number of units for sale and the auction is successful.
In a uniform-price auction, a multiplicity of equilibria exist. Some of the outcomes supported by these equilibria are "competitive" in that they ensure that .the good is sold at the reservation price of the buyers. These competitive outcomes are supported by strategy vectors in which total demand at a price of 20 is large enough to ensure that no individual bidder can lower the clearing price by withholding her demand at a price of 20. This implies that, for all bidders, the sum of all units demanded by all other bidders must be no lower than 100, or equivalently, each bidder must demand at least 10 units at the price of 20. Given the equilibrium strategy vector, the payoff from all possible strategies available to any agent is 0. This argument is presented in Proposition 1. In addition to the competitive outcomes characterized in Proposition l, in uniform-price auctions there also exist "collusive" outcomes. In these outcomes, bidders are able to extract the maximum possible value from the auction. As Back and Zen der ( 1993) and Wilson ( 1979) demonstrate, in a similar framework. the cumulative aggregate demand schedule induced by equilibrium strategies is highly inelastic. Thus, any attempt by an individual bidder to increase her allocation by placing a larger demand at a higher price results in a large jump in the clearing price. Because of this large increase in the clearing price, the bidcler is subjected to a large loss on her original allocation. Further, given the inelasticity of the cumulative clemand schedule, her allocation increases by only a small amount Thus, her loss from the increase in the clearing price more than offsets the gain from the increased allocation. In addition to equilibria in which the clearing price is 20 or 10, the uniform-price auction mechanism also has equilibria in which the clearing price is 15. Tue enforcement mechanism that sustains these equilibria is virtually identical to that which sustains equilibria with a clearing price of 10-the cumulative aggregate demand schedule induced by equilibrium strategies is highly inelastic, ensuring that penalties for deviations from equilibrium strategies through the placement of bids at prices above the clearing price are sufficient to deter deviations. Symmetry and the requisite inelasticity of the cumulative schedule are achieved by individual bidders demanding 9 units at a price of 20, 91 units at the price of 15, and 0 units at the price of 10.
As can be seen from the above discussion, there exists great variation in the equilibrium clearing prices of uniform-price auctions. There is less variation for discriminatory auctions (see Back and Zender 1993) . Demanding any units at 20, because of the discriminatory nature of the auction, locks in a 0 profit on those units and thus is a dominated strategy. However, Nasb equilibria ex.ist in which demand at 20 is submitted. In these equilibria, each bidder is held to a zero profit regardless of her strategies, with the other bidders playing dominated strategies and forcing the auction to clear at 100. The equilibrium strategies in this case are identical to the strategies that induce a clearing price of 20 in uniform price auctions.
As we demonstrate in Proposition 3, tbe only equilibrium in undominated strategies for discriminatory auctions ensures that the clearing price is 15. In equilibrium, demand is concentrated at a price of 15, with every bidder maximizing her demand at this price. To see the uniqueness of this equilibrium, note that collusive outcomes with a clearing price of 10 are not sustainable. Because of the discrim.inatory nature of the auction, a bidder is able to switch some of her demand to a higher price without affecting her profits on the unchanged portion of her demand. Tue increased allocation resulting frOm this switch increases the bidder's payoff.
Proposition 3: In a discriminatory-price auction, a unique Nash equilibrium in undominated strategies exists in which all bidders submit all demand at a price of 15, the price one tick below the competitive price.
The above results provide predictions regarding equilibrium behavior in both uniformpnce auctions and discriminatory auctions. In the following sections we describe the experimental methodology and examine subjects' behavior in light of the predictions of these results. Table 1 . Henceforth, each experiment will be referred to by its name that denotes both the treatment and a number to distinguish it from other repetitions of the same treatinent. For example, UC2 refers to repetition 2 of the unifonn-price treatment with subject-communication. An asterisk is affixed to the name of each experiment involving a number of subjects unequal to 11.
Each experiment was perfonned in a computer laboratory using a local area network to communicate subjects' bids. their allocations, and their payoffs. Subjects were seated so as to prevent others from observing their computer screens. Most experiments lasted approximately 45 minutes, with the experiments involving communication between subjects lasting 10-15 m.inutes longer. First, subjects were presented an instructional handout that explained the rules of the game and the process used in determining their payoffs. They were given 5 minutes to peruse the instructions. After this, one of the experimenters verbally explained the auction mechanism and the computer interface. This took approximately 10 minutes. Tue logistics involved in running the experiments allowed for subject communication and discussion after the instructions were completed but before the experiment commenced. The time available for such discussion varied across experiments. However, the opportunities for communication were similar across all treatments.
An experiment commenced when subjects fust entered their demand schedules into their terminals. Once all bids bad been entered, the results of the auction were electronically computed. Then each subject was electronically informed of the clearing price, her allocation, and her payoff from the auction. Other than the clearing price, subjects were not presented any information regarding other subjects' demand scbedules or the aggregate demand scbedule. At this point, subjects were given an opportunity to record their payoffs and allocations for their own reference. Once this process, or round, was complete, the auction was repeated. Each of the first four rounds took approximately 4 minutes to complete. Subsequent rounds took approximately 2 minutes to complete. All experiments were run for at least twelve rounds, with most consisting of exactly twelve rounds. Variations in the number of rounds across experiments resulted from attempts to maximize the number of rounds subject to time constraints. Subjects were not informed of the number of rounds to be played, and a perusal of the results indicates that the deletion of results from rounds after round twelve would have no qualitative impact on our conclusions.
In treatments in which communication was not permitted, subjects were not allowed to speak. to each other once the experiment commenced. In treatments allowing communication, subjects were allowed to speak to each other every two rounds. They were allowed 5 minutes for the frrst d.iscussion and 3 minutes for subsequent d.iscussions. However, no communication was allowed when subjects were entering their strategies or recording their payoffs. Communication was govemed by the following rules: subjects were not allowed leave their tenninals or show any of their personal records or notes to other subjects. However, verbal communications were unrestricted in that subjects were allowed to propose strategy for future rounds and comment on the outcomes of previous rounds. Three experimenters enforced these rules for communication.
Subjects' payoffs in each round were determined using the payoff functions described in the previous section. All prices and their payoffs were denominated in a national currency that we called "francs." Subjects' payoffs were summed across all rounds to determine their payoff in each experiment Their experiment payoffs were translated into monetary payoffs using the following formula:
where ,rrepresents a scaling factor. Tue scaling factor, which varied between 0.1and0.2, was made known to subjects before each experiment. We expected large payouts to be made in treatments involving subject communication. In order to most efficiently utilize our limited budget, we attempted to keep the total payoff the same across treatments and experiments. This called for using lower scaling factors in experiments involving communication. The resulting payoffs ranged between $0.50 and $10.00. The average payoff was approximately $5.00.9
Despite the lower scaling factors, subjects' payoffs were significantly higher in treatments that allowed for subject com.munication. Subject payoffs were also relatively sensitive to the nanrre of the adopted strategy.10 Because coordination to collusive equilibria requires significantly more effort than playing competitive strategies, any bias against effort induced by lower scaling factors for the treatments with communication would bias results against collusion. However, our results seem to indicate that variations in the scaling factors did not significantly affect our results.
Subjects' payoffs were not revealed to other subjects and were dispensed in sealed envelopes.
These payments were made from funds provided by university research funding. Subjects were informed regarding both the payment procedure and the source of the funding at the beginning of each experiment.
Attempts were made to ensure that the same number of subjects participated in each experiment. In some instances, however, the number of subjects could not be controlled. At least three repetitions of each treatment were conducted with 11 subjects. The uniform-price treatment 14 without communication was repeated four times for groups of 11. 11, 11, and 14 subjects. The uniform-price treatment with com.munication was repeated five times with groups of 11, 11, 11, 12, and 12 subjects. The discriminatory treatment without communication was repeated four times with groups of 11, 11, 11, and 10 subjects. Tbe discriminatory treatment witb subject communication was repeated three times. Each experiment was conducted with a group of 11 subjects. No subject was involved in more than one experiment.
EXPERIMENTAL REsULTS
In this section we examine the outcomes of the experiments. We begin with a prelim.inary analysis of the clearing prices, auctioneer surplus, and demand scbedules in all the experiments.
Theo we conduct statistical tests to evaluate the effects of communication and the choice of auction mecbanism on clearing prices and subject demand. To control for the biases induced by changes in group size and leaming. these tests, and all subsequent analysis, are restricted to the first 12 rounds of those experiments conducted with 11 subjects. The remaining analysis represents attempts to elucidate subject behavior through the development of simple measures of the attributes of demand vectors and clearing prices. Table 2 presents the outcomes of each treatment. Tue evolution of clearing prices over rounds is illustrated in Figure 1 . Figure 2 presents the breakdown of clearing prices in each of the four treatments. In the unifonn-price treatment with communication, the clearing price displayed the greatest range and variance. Tue collusive clearing price of 10 was observed relatively often, while the competitive price of 20 seldom obtained. With the exception of UC2 and the last round of UCI, the clearing price was never 20 in the last three rounds. Further, in UCI, UC3, and UC5 *, the market tended to clear at a price of 10 in the latter rounds. In UC2, clearing prices 15 displayed a contrasting pattem. Tue clearing price was 10 for the first six rounds and 20 for the last four rounds. lt appeared that subjects are able to collude at the inception of the experiment, but coordination broke down as the experiment progressed. In the uniform-price treatment without communication, the clearing price was never 10 and displayed little variation. With the exception of Ul, the clearing price was 20 in almost all rounds. In the discriminatory treatments both with and without communication, the clearing price of 10 was never observed, and 15 was the most frequent clearing price. In fact, in the last two rounds of all of these experiments, 15 was the only clearing price.
1 Preliminary Findings
Data on the acutioneer's surplus are also presented in Table 2 Table 3 reveals that aggregate demand always exceeded 100 units, indicating that the auction was always successful. However, weakly dominated strategies calling for demand of less than 100 units were observed. In the unifonn-price treatment without communication subjects failed to demand 100 units 28 percent of the time. In contrast. in the unifonn-price treatment with subject communication, subjects failed to demand 100 units only 12.5 percent of the time. Less variation was observed in discriminatory treatments. In the treatment witb subject 11 While the auctioneer's surplus in discriminatory treatments was somewhat smaller than thc surplus in the unifonn-price treannents without communication, this may have bcen an artifact of the large '"tick size" in our expcrimcnt. Note that the increment between admissible bids, the "tick size," was 5 while the range between the maximum and minimum bids was 10. Thus, the tick size was one half of the range of admissible bids. This is much !arger than the proportion betwecn range and tick size in actual auctions. ff, in fact, our results indicate that Nash strategies will be played in actual discriminatory auctions, thcn, with smaller tick sizes, thc lasses from discriminatory auctions should be not be much highcr than the those in uniform.-price auctions where bidders adopt competitive sttategies. communication, subjects demanded less than 100 units only 12.9 percnt of the time, while they failed to demand 100 units 16.5 percent of the time in the treatment without communication. Table 3 , provides evidence on evolution of demand over time.
With the exception of UC2, in the uniform-price treatment with communication, demand at price levels of 20 and 15 tended to decline over rounds. This, combined with the fact that cumulative demand at the price level of 20 was quite close to 99 in later rounds, seems to indicate that subjects' strategies approached the collusive strategies described in Proposition 2. In fact, for UCl, UC3, and UC5*, the cumulative demand in the last six rounds corresponded almost exactly to that characterizing collusive outcomes. In UC2, On the other hand, ~ubject strategies corresponded exactly to naive collusive strategies of placing maximal demand at the lowest price of 10, during the frrst six rounds. In round seven, one of the subjects demandecl 100 units at the price of 15, eliminating any gains to the other subjects. At this point, coordination between subjects broke down and their demand vectors resembled those inducing the competitive outcome.12 In contrast, in the uniform-price treatment without communication, aggregate 12 From subject comm.unication subsequent to mund seven, it was apparent that they were attempting to revert to the naive collusive strategies played in earlier rounds. On rcalizing that the strategies were not sclf-enforcing, thcy attcmpted., albeit unsuccessfully, to agree on a trigger mechanism to enfon:e penalties for future dcviations from the naive strategies.
demand at price levels of 20 and 10 displayed a tendency to decline over time. The trajectories of demand in the discriminatory treatments displayed different characteristics. Demand at a price level of 20 showed a marked decline while demand at a price level of 15 increased. Demand at a price of 10 also displayed a weak. tendency to decline. Tue decline in the demand at the price of 20 is not surprising given that any strategy calling for demand at this price is weakly dominated.
Statistical Comparisons
Tables 4 and 5 present the outcomes of statistical tests performed to exam.ine the effects of communication and changes in the auction mechanism on subject strategies. Table 4 Tue results also demonstrate that, after controlling for com.munication between subjects, changes in the auction mechanism induced significant changes in the distnbution of clearing prices.
T able 5 documents the impact of changes in the experimental setting an subject strategies. lt presents the statistic used in the Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test for differences in the level of aggregate demand at the three price levels. Once again, our results indicate that changes in the opportunities for communication significantly influenced subject strategies in the unifonnprice treatments but bad almost no effect in the discriminatory treatments. Subjects demanded significantly fewer units at prices of 20 and at 15 while demanding significantly more at the price of 10 in the uniform-price treatment with communication. Further, changes in the auction mecbani.sm also exerted significant influence on subject strategies despite holding constant for opportunities for communication. Subject demand at the price of 15 was significantly higher in the discriminatory treatment relative to their uniform-price counterparts. On the other band, subject demand at 20 was significantly higher in the uniform-price auction without 18 communication than in its discriminatory counterpart. In the treatments with communication.
subject demand at a price of 10 was significantly higher in the uniform-price treatment. Table 6 presents evidence on convergence to equilibrium strategies characterized in Section 1. For a given clearing price, convergence to equilibrium strategies is measured by the average of the Euclidean distances of subjects' strategies from the associated equilibrium demand vector. If there exist multiple demand vectors inducing the same clearing price, distance is measured from the center convex hull of this set of equilibrium demand vectors.13 These measures are normalized by dividing by 2Q.14 As Table 6 and Figure 4 indicate, in the uniform-price treatment without communication, subject strategies clid not display a marked tendency to approach any equilibrium strategy vector.
Other Characteristics of Subject Strategies
However, a weak tendency to approach the equilibrium strategy vector that induces a clearing price of 15 was apparent. Tbe ability to communicate bad a marked influence on subject behavior. In experiments UCl and UC3, subject strategies displayed a marked tendency to approach the equilibrium strategy vector inducing a clearing price of 10 and diverged from the equilibrium strategy inducing a clearing price of 15. In experiment UC2, however, the opposite tendency was observed. Subject behavior in the discriminatory treatment without communication displayed a less dramatic but more consistent pattern. Demand vectors tended to approach the strategy vector inducing a clearing price of 15 and diverged from strategies that induce a clearing price of 20. Communication between subjects in discriminatory auctions tended to increase both 13 We measure distance from the barycenter of this set because all Nash equilibrium demand vectors Iie within close proximity of this set. For example, in the uniform·price treatment the transfer of one unit of demand at a price of 20 to augment demand at a price of 10 is all that differentiates a point in this set from the symmetric equilibrium strategy that induces a clearing price of 10. Thus, any distance mcasure based on minimizing distance from this set produces little cross·sectional variation and, thus, is not very informative. 1 4 Note that the absolute magnitude of each of these mcasurcs is irrelevant; only their relative magnitudes can bc used to makc inferences. The normalizing factors for each of tbe mcasures developcd in the papcr bave becn chosen to facilitate prcsentation of thc results in a compact form. distance measures and to an even greater extent increase the round-to-round volatility of both distance measures.15
We also considered the degree of symmetry between shareholder strategies. Tue structure of the auctions is symmetric, in that payoffs to bidders are invariant to permutations of the index set. However, there exist asymmetric equilibria. Thus, it is of interest to detennine the degree of symmetry observed in shareholder strategies. To measure symmetry, we first computed the Euclidean distance of subjects' demand in each round from the average demand vector for the round. This measure of symmetry was standardized by dividing by 10. As Table 7 sbows, subjects' strategies exhibited a tendency to become more symmetric over time in all four treatments. The changes in symmetry across rounds were most dramatic in the uniform-price treatment with communication. In UCl and UC3, there was a significant increase in symmetry while in UC2 there was a significant decrease in sym.metry. Another pattem that emerges is that subject strategies in the uniform-price treatment with communication tended to be the most symmetric while the strategies of subjects in the uniform-price treatment without communication displayed the lowest degree of symmetry. Table 8 considers the effect of the clearing price on bids submitted in the subsequent round. Theory provides little guidance as to the dynamics of convergence to the equilibrium behavior. Nevertheless, the idea of the tatonment process in classical economic thought suggests that demand may ad.just based on observed prices. To investigate this effect in our experimental setting we computed the Pearson-product moment correlation coefficient between demand at each price and lagged clearing prices. Tue resulting outcome was standardized by multiplying by 100. The results in Table 8 indicate significantly different dynamics across treatments. In the uniform-price treatments, demand at the price of 20 is positively related to lagged prices. This is 20 consistent with the notion that subjects felt that the high price in the current round signaled a high price in future rnunds and adjusted their demand at 20 upward to ensure acceptance of tbeir bids. In the discriminatory treatments there was a marked tendency of demand to rise at the price of 20 and fall at the price of 15 subsequent to a relatively high price in tbe previous rnund. Table 9 presents evidence on the stability of subject's strategies in the experiments. The stability of subject strategies was measured using tbe Euclidean distance of each subject's dernand vector frnm her average demand vector. This statistic was nonnalized by dividing by 33.
From Table 9 it is apparent that, with the exception of two experiments permitting subject communication, UC2 and DCl, there was a marked tendency for subjects' strategies to exhibit greater stability over time. Not surprisingly, in the uniform-price treatment with subject communication, subject strategies displayed considerable stability once a pattem of collusive behavior emerged.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
In this paper, we provided experimental evidence on strategy choice in auctions of shares.
Our experiments indicate that, in uniform-price auctions, non-binding pre-play communication facilitates convergence to equilibrium outcomes. When opportunities for communication are available, bidders are more likely to gravitate towards self-enforcing collusive strategies. In the absence of communication opportunities, a clear pattem of convergence to Nash behavior is less evident. In discriminatory auctions, however, bidder strategies approximate the unique equilibrium outcome. This produces a larger surplus for the auctioneer than the collusive outcome in the uniform-price auction.
These results have important implications for the design of Treasury auctions. Because participants in these auctions have ample opportunities to communicate, it would appear that uniform-price auctions will net the Treasury lower revenues. Further, because our results indicate that bidders' strategies will quickly converge to collusive strategies, it would appear that there would be an almost immediate drop in the Treasury's revenues once uniform-price auctions are employed. This evidence is consistent with that of Simon ( 1992) but is inconsistent with the predictions of researchers such as Friedman ( 1960) .
Our results also have interesting implications for researcbers. The tendency for subjects to gravitate towards symmetric strategies, especially when they are permitted to com.municate and there exist totally symmetric Nash equilibria, would seem to indicate that greater emphasis should be placed on the existence of symmetric equilibria in facilitating the attainment of Paretooptirn.al self-enforcing agreements. Secondly, our results also point to the dynamic instability of competitive equilibria in which agents' payoffs are minimized and all feasible strategies are best responses to the equilibrium strategy vector. When this is the case, agents' strategy choices tend to wander.16 Although a ch_ange in any individual agent's strategy by itself can have no effect on the outcome, because all agents exhibit a tendency to change their strategies. divergence from the equilibrium competitive price is observed fairly frequently.
Our investigation focused primarily on subjects' bidding strategies. Our experimental design did not pennit us to analyze the effects of private information regarding valuations, transparency of the auction process, and secondary markets on equilibrium auction behavior.
Extensions of our design to incorporate these effects seem fairly obvious. There exist numerous examples of experimental auction designs in which bidders possess private information regarding their reservation prices (see. for example, Smith 1967). In fact, it is the performance of unüorm-price auctions in this setting that has led to its appeal among economists. A synthesis of existing experimental designs with ours will permit the examination of the impact of incomplete 16 See Young (1993) for an analysis of best-reply structures and the evolutionary adaptation needod for convergcnce.
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information on behavior in auctions. Tue effect of the transparency of the auction process can also be examined by a fairly straightforward extension of our design. For example, the experiment could be performed while revealing both the clearing price as weil as the aggregate demand schedule to the subjects after each round. Changing the auction design to study the effect of secondary markets on subject behavior is not as simple. One alternative would be to meld the existing auction model with an experimental implementation of a double auction market, where winning auction participants can trade their allocations after the completion of each round of the auction. 'J = (d1, dz, -·· '1i-l· d;', d;+J . ... , d11) . A Nash equilibrium is a
·--····---------
all bidders L Proof of Lemma 1: Any strategy in which the total demand of an individual bidder is less than 100 units is dominated by a strategy in which the bidder increases her demand at the lowest price of 10 by an amount that sets total demand equal to 100 units. If some of the additional demand submitted is accepted. the bidder's payoff is strictly higher; otherwise she is no worse off. 0
Proof of Proposition 1: Clearly, if other bidders, in aggregate, demand more than a total of 100 units at a price of 20, any demand schedule is a best response. In the event that other bidders' aggregate demand at a price of 20 is lower than 100 units, a bidder will never subm.it a bid that (ii) Now we show that there is no Nash equilibrium in undominated strategies where the clearing price is either 10 or 20. Tue latter result follows directly from (i) . To see the frrst result, note that the assumption that N = 11 along with our choice of parameters ensures that given a clearing price of 10, bidders can always increase their allocation and payoffby moving some demand from a price of 10 to place bids at a price of 15. (iii) Now, to complete the proof, we establisb that, in any Nash equilibrium, bidders will concentrate all demand at a price of 15. To see this, suppose that bidders adopt another strategy. Switching all clemand to a price of 15 will increase bidder payoffs. This follows because payoff from bids marle at a prices of 10 and 20 are 0, given that the clearing price must be 15.
The proof is concluded by noting that concentrating all demand at a price of 15 is a Nash equilibrium. 0 
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